

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 7 AMMAN 3716

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, JO, US, XF

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF US SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
FOR FY 1979

REF: A) STATE 133136 B) AMMAN A-10, JAN 28,1977

FOLLOWING IS MY ASSESSMENT OF JORDANIAN SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS AND US INTERESTS SERVED IN SUPPORTING
THESE NEEDS IN THE FY 1979 PROGRAM:

1. U.S. INTERESTS SERVED. (THESE ARE DISCUSSED
EXTENSIVELY IN REF B AND ARE SUMMARIZED HERE).
JORDAN IS IMPORTANT TO U.S. INTERESTS IN ITS
ROLE AS A PROMOTER OF AND PARTY TO A MODERATE
SOLUTION TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. JORDANIAN
SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S. IS KEY
FACTOR IN MAINTAINING JORDAN'S MODERATE STANCE
TOWARD MIDEAST DISPUTE, SINCE THIS RELATIONSHIP
STRENGTHENS JORDAN'S ABILITY TO WITHSTAND PRESSURES
PLACED ON IT BY MORE RADICAL ARAB NEIGHBORS (INCLUDING
PLO). SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ITS ROLE IN ENCOURAGING
JORDANIAN MODERATION SERVES ALSO TO LIMIT SOVIET INFLUENCE

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IN THE MIDDLE EAST. FURTHER, IT PROVIDES JORDAN WITH
MEANS TO RESTRICT FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY ALONG THE LONGEST
ARAB BORDER WITH ISRAEL. IN ADDITION, SECURITY ASSISTANCE
ALLOWS JORDAN TO CONTRIBUTE TO POLITICAL STABILITY OF
ARAB PENINSULA BE SERVING AS BUFFER AGAINST THE DRIFT
SOUTHWARD OF MORE RADICAL ARAB POLITICAL IDEAS, AS WELL
AS BY CONTRIBUTING (WITH US PERMISSION) MILITARY AND

SECURITY TRAINING, ADVISORS AND EQUIPMENT TO SOME ARAB PENINSULA STATES -- THEREBY ACTING TO ENHANCE STABILITY IN OIL-RICH PENINSULA AREA. FINALLY, SECURITY ASSISTANCE IS CRUCIAL TO SURVIVAL OF HASHEMITE MONARCHY, A FRIEND OF US FOR OVER 25 YEARS, WHICH DEPENDS HEAVILY ON LOYALTY OF ARMY FOR ITS CONTINUATION IN POWER.

2. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES:

A. ENCOURAGE JORDAN'S INCLINATION TO PURSUE MODERATE AND ENGAGED POSTURE IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. KEY TO THIS POLICY IS ASSURANCE TO KING HUSSEIN OF IMPORATNCE WE ATTACH TO CONTINUING SPECIAL TIES BETWEEN US AND JORDAN. SECURITY ASSISTANCE IS SIGNIFICANT ASPECT OF THESE TIES. RECENT EMERGENCE TO POWER OF LIKUD BLOC IN ISRAEL INTERJECTS ELEMENT INTO MIDEAST EQUATION WHICH FROM ARAB PERSPECTIVE INCREASES CHANCES FOR WAR. IN THIS PERIOD OF HEIGHTENED TENSIONS, JORDANIANS MUST CONTINUE TO BE MADE AWARE OF OUR RESOLVE TO BACK MODERATE APPROACH TO PROBLEM, BOTH AS EXPRESSION OF OUR CONFIDENCE IN KING HUSSEIN AND AS ALTERNATIVE TO ANY READICAL SOLUTION WHICH MIGHT BE ESPOUSED BY EITHER ARABS OR ISRAELIS. A MILITRILY SECURE JORDAN CAN, WITHIN LIMITS, PLAY ACTIVE ROLE IN MOVING NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD, BOTH IN COUNCILS OF ITS NEIGHBORING ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND THROUGH A MORE ACTIVE ROLE (AS U.S. PREFERS) FOR JORDAN IN CONNECTION WITH WEST BANK. AT PRESENT TIME, GOJ IS GIVING CONCRETE EXPRESSION TO

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THIS AIM BY PROHIBITING RETURN OF ARMED FEDAYEEN TO EAST BANK.

B. MAINTAIN JORDAN'S DETERMINATION TO PURSUE FOREIGN POLICY INDEPENDENT OF WILL OF ITS NEIGHBORS, ESPECIALLY ON QUESTIONS OF WAGING WAR. WHILE RELATED TO GOAL OF ENCOURAGING MODERATE SOLUTION TO MIDEAST PROBLEM, THIS OBJECTIVE FOCUSES ON JORDAN'S PECULIARLY EXPOSED POLITICAL POSITION WITH RESPECT TO MORE RADICAL ARAB STATES, AND ON RISKS THIS POSES FOR JORDANIAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANOTHER ARAB-ISRAELI WAR. A FRUSTRATED PEACE EFFORT IN 1977 WOULD INCREASE STATURE IN ARAB WORLD OF HAWKS SUCH AS IRAQ, LIBYA, AND PALESTINIAN REJECTIONISTS AND DECREASE THAT OF MODERATES SUCH AS SADAT AND HUSSEIN. PRESSURES ON JORDAN TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY FUTURE MIDEAST WAR

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ARE ALSO GREATER IN 1977 THAN THEY WERE IN 1973 DUE
PRIMARILY TO JORDAN'S SOMEWHAT CLOSER TIES TO SYRIA.
AT SAME TIME, JORDAN'S MILITARY POSTURE BECAME EVEN MORE
DEFENSE-ORIENTED IN 1976 WITH DECISIONS TO REDUCE FROM
5 TO 4 DIVISIONS AND TO LOOK FOR BUYERS FOR ITS F-104
SQUADRON. TO ENCOURAGE THIS POSTURE, US SHOULD MAINTAIN
SUBSTANTIAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE LEVELS TO JORDAN, WHICH,
EVEN THEN ARE NOT PROPORTIONATE TO LEVELS OF ASSISTANCE
AVAILABLE TO OTHER COUNTRIES OF MIDDLE EAST. BY ALLOWING
KING HUSSEIN TO MAINTAIN CREDIBLE DEFENSE POSTURE, WE
REDUCE POSSIBILITY THAT HE WILL SOME DAY BE FORCED TO
ACCEPT DEFEAT AT THE HANDS OF ARAB RADICALS. WE
APPRECIATE ARMS RESTRAINT POLICY OF PRESIDENT CARTER
AND STRESS THAT DETERRENT REQUIRED BY JORDANIANS IS NOT
OPEN-ENDED. WE RECOMMEND THAT DEFENSE CAPABILITY SHOULD
ALLOW JORDAN TO WITHSTAND ATTACK FROM MORE HEAVILY-ARMED
NEIGHBORS FOR PERIOD OF ABOUT ONE OR TWO WEEKS. IN SUM,
FOR PURPOSES OF BOTH EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL STABILITY
AND CREDIBILITY, A MINIMAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT IS
REQUIRED.

C. HELP JORDAN SUPPORT POLITICAL STABILITY OF OIL-RICH
ARAB PENINSULA. OIL-RICH STATES OF ARAB PENINSULA
CONTRIBUTE MORE IN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN THAN
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DOES US. JORDAN IN TURN SERVES AS MILITARY AND IDEOLOGICAL
BUFFER AGAINST SOUTHWARD DRIFT OF RADICAL POLITICAL IDEAS.
IT SUPPLEMENTS THIS ROLE BY SUPPLYING MORE THAN 1400
ACTIVE DUTY AND RETIRED JORDANIAN MILITARY AND SECURITY
PERSONNEL TO SEVEN ARAB PENINSULA STATES, WITH ABOUT
1000 PENINSULA STUDENTS GRADUATING ANNUALLY FROM JOR-
DANIAN MILITARY SCHOOLS. JORDANIAN SECURITY ASSISTANCE

IS SOMETIMES MORE ACCEPTABLE TO ARAB STATES THAN IS DIRECT US BILATERAL ASSISTANCE, AND JORDAN'S ABILITY TO SUPPLY IT SHOULD BE ENHANCED. JORDAN'S IMPORTANCE AS MILITARY SECURITY TRAINING CENTER ESPOUSING US DOCTRINE AND EQUIPMENT SHOULD ALSO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, PARTICULARLY IN CONSIDERING GRANT TRAINING FUNDS.

D. HELP MAINTAIN POLITICAL STABILITY OF KING HUSSEIN'S GOVERNMENT. THE ARMED FORCES ARE PRIMARY SUPPORT OF HASHEMITE MONARCHY. MUCH OF KING HUSSEIN'S ABILITY TO EXERT LEADERSHIP AUTHORITY OVER HIS TROOPS DERIVES FROM HIS SECURE RELATIONSHIP WITH US, AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS RELATIONSHIP IN TERMS OF MILITARY SALARIES AND SUPPLIES. RECENT DISGRUNTLEMENT WITHIN ARMED FORCES OVER SEVERE INFLATIONARY AND HOUSING PRESSURES HAS UNDERSCORED DEGREE TO WHICH OFFSETTING US SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN WITH ITS EMPHASIS ON MODERNIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES IS NECESSARY ELEMENT IN MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL STABILITY. SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION OF LEVEL OF US SECURITY AID WOULD HAVE NEGATIVE EFFECT ON TROOP MORALE AND, ULTIMATELY, ON STABILITY OF HASHEMITE REGIME.

3. FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS KEYED TO QUESTIONS ASKED IN PARA 4, REFERENCE MESSAGE:

4A. THREAT:

(1) JORDANIAN PERCEPTION OF THE EXACT LEVEL OF THREAT
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THREAT FROM ANY PARTICULAR QUARTER VARIES ACCORDING TO POLITICAL CONDITIONS OF THE MOMENT. HOWEVER, IN THE LONG TERM IT SEES ITSELF SURROUNDED ON THE WEST, NORTH AND NORTHEAST BY UNFRIENDLY (ISRAEL, IRAQ) OR POTENTIALLY UNFRIENDLY STATES (SYRIA), ALL OF WHOM ARE MUCH BETTER ARMED AND EQUIPPED THAN ARE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES.

PRESENTLY, ONLY ISRAEL WITH ITS OVERWHELMING MILITARY, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND ECONOMIC SUPERIORITY IS SEEN AS AN IMMEDIATE THREAT. JORDANIAN PERCEPTION OF THREAT HAS BEEN GREATLY INCREASED SINCE LIKUD VICTORY IN ISRAEL OF MAY 1977. JORDAN BELIEVES IT COULD DO LITTLE MORE THAN BLUNT AND HOLD FOR A VERY SHORT TIME AN ISRAEL ASSAULT ON JORDAN ITSELF, OR ONE USING JORDANIAN SOIL FOR A FLANKING ATTACK AGAINST SYRIA.

JORDAN ALSO CONSIDERS ITSELF VULNERABLE, TO A LESSER DEGREE, TO AN ATTACK FROM SYRIA. ALTHOUGH JORDANIAN LEADERS ARE NOT OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS THREAT IN THE SHORT TERM, THEY REMEMBER HISTORIC SYRIAN ANTI-PATHY

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TO JORDAN AND VIEW THE CURRENT RAPPROACHMENT WITH SYRIA
AS A TEMPORARY PHENOMENOM WHICH COULD CHANGE TOMORROW.
THEY RECALL THE SYRIAN INVASION DURING THE 1970 CIVIL
WAR, SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR THE FEDAYEEN OVER THE YEARS,
AND OTHER SYRIAN ACTIONS INIMICAL TO JORDAN.

IRAQ IS SEEN AS A GEOGRAPHICALLY MORE REMOTE, BUT
IDEOLOGICALLY VERY REAL THREAT AGAINST WHICH JORDAN
MUST BE PREPARED. IRAQI-JORDANIAN RELATIONS HAVE BEEN
UNEASY OVER THE YEARS: THE VIRULENT BA'ATHI ASSAULT
ON THE MONARCHY DURING THE ARAB COLD WAR IIN THE 1960'S,
AND IRAQI IRRENDENTISM ON THE NE CORNER OF JORDAN (ALONG
WITH PERIODIC TROOP MANEUVERS IN THE SAME AREA),
IRAQI-SYRIAN TENSIONS, AND IRAQI SUPPORT OF THE FEDAYEEN
IN JORDAN, ARE ALL RECENT REMINDERS OF HOW TENUOUS ARE
JORDAN'S RELATIONS WITH ITS EATERN NEIGHBOR.

(2) I GENERALLY CONCUR IN JORDAN'S ASSESSMENT OF
THREAT, BUT AM LESS APPREHENSIVE THAT ISRAEL WOULD
ATTACK JORDAN IN ANY FUTURE CONFLICT WITHOUT DIRECT
PROVOCATION. REAL POSSIBILITY, AS I SEE IT, IS THAT
JORDAN MIGHT BE DRAWN INTO A FIFTH ARAB/ISRAELI WAR
AS IT WAS IN 1967, (AS OPPOSED TO 1973 EXPERIENCE).
WHILE THERE APPEARS TO BE LESS DANGER NOW THAN BEFORE
THAT EGYPT AND SYRIA ARE CONSIDERING MILITARY OPTION,
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PRESSURES FOR RENEWED HOSTILITIES WOULD CERTAINLY
INCREASE IF PEACE PROCESS BOGS DOWN. JORDAN, WITH
GREATER DIPLOMATIC INVESTMENT IN SYRIAN TIES, WOULD

FIND IT SLIGHTLY MORE DIFFICULT THAN IN 1973 TO STAY OUT OF MOVEMENT TOWARD NEW ARAB/ISRAELI HOSTILITIES, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD TRY HARD TO LIMIT ITS INVOLVEMENT AS IT DID IN 1973 WAR.

4B. COUNTERING THE THREAT:

(1) SINCE JORDAN IS FULLY AWARE OF ITS COMPARATIVE MILITARY WEAKNESS AGAINST ANY OF ITS THREE POSSIBLE ANTAGONISTS, IT'S APPROACH TO COUNTERING THREAT HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN ONE OF DIPLOMATIC SUASION AND POLITICAL MODERATION, NOT ONLY ON ARAB-ISRAELI QUESTIONS, BUT ALSO OTHER REGIONAL PROBLEMS. UNTIL RECENTLY THIS DIPLOMATIC POSTURE HAS BEEN MAJOR LIABILITY IN JORDAN'S RELATIONS WITH A NUMBER OF ITS IMPORTANT ARAB NEIGHBORS, BUT WITH CURRENT MOVE TOWARD NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT THIS SITUATION HAS CHANGED. JORDAN'S IMPROVED STANDING AS A POTENTIAL PARTY TO ANY PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE HELPFUL TO THE US IN MOVING PEACE PROCESS FORWARD. THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY SO IF RABAT DECISION GIVING PRIMACY TO THE PLO WERE CHANGED (OR, AS IS MORE LIKELY, CONVENIENTLY FORGOTTEN OR ALLOWED TO EURODE) FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE, JORDAN IS LIKELY TO BE KEY TO ANY FUTURE WEST BANK SETTLEMENT.

(2) OF ALL CONFRONTATION STATES, JORDAN HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN IN FOREFRONT IN SEEKING NEGOTIATED ACCOMODATION WITH ISRAELIS. SINCE 1971 JORDAN HAS IN EFFECT PROTECTED ISRAEL'S EASTERN FLANK FROM FEDAYEEN INCURSIONS. FURTHER, JORDAN'S DEFENSE PLOICY HAS BEEN ESSENTIALLY DEFENSIVE AND DETERRENT IN NATURE. THIS RECENTLY REEMPHASIZED BY REDUCTIONS NOTED ABOVE (PARA. 2B.) PLAN TO INSTALL THE I-HAWK SYSTEM AT
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FIXED SITES IS ANOTHER INDICATION OF JORDAN'S DETERMINATION TO DEFEND RATHER THAN ATTACK, A POSTURE EMBASSY SUPPORTS AND ENCOURAGES.

4C. CURRENT MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT: AS DISCUSSED ABOVE, JORDAN IS TAILORING ITS MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT FOR DEFENSE AND DETERRENCE RATHER THAN OFFENSE. CURRENT ORGANIZATION OF TWO ARMORED DIVISIONS, TWO MECH INFANTRY DIVISIONS, TWO INDEPENDENT BRIGADES (SPECIAL FORCES AND ROYAL GUARDS), AND A SMALL, AIR DEFENSE-ORIENTED AIR FORCE IS THOUGHT TO BE THE MOST ECNONMICAL FORCE CONSISTENT WITH JORDAN'S MILITARY AND SECURITY NEEDS. IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT SINCE 1968, US AND JORDANIAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE WORKED CLOSELY TO DEVELOP MODERN MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE WHICH ATTEMPTS TO BALANCE JORDAN'S SECURITY REQUIREMENTS WITH AVAILABLE MANPOWER AND ECONOMIC RESOURCES. THIS ACCOMPLISHED ON TWO LEVELS. LOCALLY, WE CONCENTRATE ON IMPROVING LOGISTICS AND

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MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES, ENSURING THAT REQUISITE TRAINING IS PROGRAMMED BEFORE ARRIVAL OF NEW EQUIPMENT, IMPROVING PLANNING AND BUDGETING ACTIVITIES, COORDINATING IN-COUNTRY PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION, AND PROVIDING FOLLOW-ON ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE AS NECESSARY.

AT HIGHER LEVEL, THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION (ESTABLISHED IN 1974) MEETS SEMI-ANNUALLY TO REVIEW AND COORDINATE CURRENT PROGRAMS, DISCUSS FIVE-YEAR MODERNIZATION PLANS, AND ESTABLISH MILITARY ASSISTANCE PRIORITIES. THROUGH THIS SYSTEM THE US EXERTS POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON JAF DEVELOPMENT AND PROMOTES A PRO-US ATTITUDE WITHIN JAF LEADERSHIP.

4D. LISTED BELOW IN PRIORITY ORDER ARE DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES THAT JORDAN IS LIKELY TO SEEK TO ACQUIRE FROM US IN FY 79. JORDAN WILL USE LISTED EQUIPMENT TO OFFSET TOE SHORTFALL INDICATED FOR EACH ITEM. CALCULATED SHORTFALL QUANTITY IS BASED UPON ASSUMPTION THAT FY 77 AND FY 78 GA & FMSCR ITEMS ARE PURCHASED. SUPPORT ITEMS WILL BE USED TO MAINTAIN EQUIPMENT CURRENTLY ON HAND AS WELL AS THAT PLANNED FOR FY 77 THROUGH 79. ESSENTIALLY JORDANIANS ARE USING THESE ITEMS TO BRING THEIR PRESENT GROUND AND AIR FORCE UP TO STRENGTH LEVELS WE AND THEY CONSIDER ADEQUATE FOR UNITS IN QUESTION. LESS COSTLY
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OR LESS ADVANCED ITEMS THAN THOSE INDICATED HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY REVIEWED, ARE NOT CONSIDERED MILITARILY ACCEPTABLE, AND WOULD NOT MEET US OBJECTIVES IN JORDAN: BELIEVE THAT PROVIDING THESE MODERATE AND REASONABLE EQUIPMENT NEEDS WILL BE A KEY MOTIVATING FACTOR IN SUSTAINING JORDAN'S POLICY OF SUPPORTING US DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES IN M.E. IN OUR OPINION, US MILITARY SUPPORT TO JORDAN IS VIEWED AS A BAROMETER OF THE US COMMITMENT TO JORDAN AND BY EXTENSION, TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS. SHOULD IT FALTER, SO WILL JORDAN'S ABILITY TO PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN SEEKING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. ALSO, JORDAN'S CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY HAS LONG BEEN IN THE REGIONAL INTERESTS OF THE US, AND THIS WILL BE OF HIGHLY INCREASED IMPORTANCE IF THE FIANL PEACE SETTLEMENT RESULTS IN, FOR EXAMPLE, A CONFEDERAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST BANKS OF THE JORDAN.

PLEASE READ THE CHART AS FOLLOWS:
PRIORITY/ITEM/IMET/GA/FMSCR/FMS CASH/COMMERCIAL/FY78 SHORTFALL

1/TRAINING/2.0/-/-/.5/-/-
2/SUPPLY SUPPORT AGREEMENTS/-/-/-/36.0/-/-
3/F5F/-/7- 9.4/-/-/-/7
4/FSE/-/2-6.8/-/-/-/2
5/F5 CSP/-/-/2.0/-/-/-
6/Dragon MISSILE/-/700/2.6/-/-/-/1475
7/TOW MISSILE/-/600/2.8/-/-/-/746
8/M110A1 HOW/-/-/18-14.4/-/-/22
9/M109A1B HOW/-/18-8.4/20-9.3/-/-/38
10/HOW CSP/-/-/3.0/-/-/-
11/M48A5 TANK/-/-/31-12.4/-/-/31
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12/TANK CSP/-/-/1.0/-/-/-
13/ACFT ENGINES W/AB/-/-/4-1.4/-/-/-
14/M88A1 RECOVERY VEHICLES/-/-/5-3.4/-/-/34
15/AMMO/-/-/1.0/-/-/-
16/COMMO EQUIP/-/-/1.5/-/-/-
17/ARMOR REBUILD/-/-/6.0/-/-/-
18/C-30H ACFT/-/-/2-19.0/-/-/2
19/ACFT REFUELER/-/-/6-7.3/-/-/8
20/P10 FIRE TRUCK/-/-/4-.1/-/-/6
21/RUNWAY SWEEPER/-/-/1-.1/-/-/1

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PRIORITY/ITEM/IMET/GA/FMSCR/FMS CASH/COMMERCIAL/FY 78 SHORTFALL
22/AH1S HELO/-/-/6-13.1/-/-/6
23/OTHER ARTICLES & SUPPORT EQUIP/-/-/-/2.0/-
-/TOTALS/-/50.0/95.0/36.5/2.0/-

4E. BELIEVE THERE WILL BE NO SERIOUS ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE GOJ ECONOMY, DEBT SERVICE CAPABILITY, OR DEVELOPMENT PLANS IF THE ABOVE DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES ARE QCQUIRED. OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE COSTS OF EQUIPMENT ACQUIRED CAN BE SUPPORTED BY MILITARY ITEMS OF GOJ BUDGET WITHOUT INCREASED STRAIN, AND IN SOME CASES ITEMS CONTRIBUTE TO MORE EFFICIENT FUNCTIONING OF JAF. THIS HELPS REDUCE COSTS. JORDANIAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT DEPENDS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON AVAILABILITY OF EXTERNAL FINANCING, I.E. MAP, FMSCR (CONSIGNED AND DEFRAID BY THIRD COUNTRY), AND ARAB GRANT SUBSIDIES. SEE AMMAN 3648 FOR DETAILED EXPLANATION OF EFFECTS OF JORDANIAN MILITARY ON THE CIVIL ECONOMY.

4F. NO INCREASE IN USG OR CIVILIAN CONTRACT PERSONNEL ANTICIPATED AS RESULT OF THE FY 79 PROGRAM. (TOTAL CURRENT STRENGTH FOLLOWS: MAP OFFICE 11; I-HAWK PROGRAM INCLUDES 8 DOD AND 8 CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL). EACH LINE ITEM RECOMMENDED IS EITHER CURRENTLY IN JAF INVENTORY, SCHEDULED FOR DELIVERY IN FY 77/78, OR,
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IN THE CASE OF THE AH1S HELICOPTER, PROGRAMMED IN THE FY 77/78 FMSCR PROGRAM.
4G. EVEN THOUGH IT IS ALMOST TOTALLY COMMITTED TO US EQUIPMENT, SHOULD JORDAN BELIEVE IT TO BE IN ITS NATIONAL INTEREST,

IT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY FEEL BOUND TO ACCEPT US DECISION THAT A PARTICULAR ITEM OF EQUIPMENT WAS NOT SUITABLE OR AVAILABLE FOR ITS INVENTORY. CASE IN POINT IS THE I-HAWK/ SOVIET SAM SYSTEM CONTROVERSY. MAJOR AND CONTINUING CONSTRAINT, HOWEVER, IS AVAILABILITY OF FINANCING, I.E., *49. -7\$8 -4-?8- 94 95#34 &7)* 5-53 . SAUDI ARABIA BALKED AT IDEA OF INTRODUCING SOVIET EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL TO JORDAN, AND WOULD PROBABLY DO SO AGAIN IF QUESTION SHOULD COME UP. SAME CAVEAT WOULD NOT APPLY TO ACQUISITION OF WESTERN ARMS AND EQUIPMENT AND COMPARABLE ITEMS AND SERVICES LISTED ABOVE. CONSIDER IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT JORDAN WOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THE ACQUISITION OF SOVIET OR BLOC MILITARY EQUIPMENT BECAUSE OF MAJOR POLITICAL, SUPPLY, MAINTENANCE AND TRAINING PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM INTEGRATION OF UNLIKE SYSTEMS, BELIEVE IT MORE LIKELY THAT JORDAN WOULD ATTEMPT TO CHANGE A KEY US DECISION THROUGH PERSUASION, OR THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF ANOTHER COUNTRY SUCH AS SAUDI ARABIA.

4H. JORDAN'S NEIGHBORS ALL HAVE COMPARABLE AND GREATLY MORE SOPHISTICATED TYPES OF EQUIPMENT, AND IN MUCH GREATER QUANTITIES, THAN THOSE ANTICIPATED IN THE FY 79 SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. JORDAN'S PLANNED ACQUISITIONS ARE NOT LIKELY TO INCREASE OTHER'S PLANS. JORDAN'S NON-ACQUISITIONS OF THE ABOVE EQUIPMENT WILL CERTAINLY NOT DISSUADE ISRAEL, SYRIA OR IRAQ FROM CONTINUING TO BUILD THEIR FORCES.

BELIEVE THIS PROGRAM IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN MAINTAINING PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE AREA.
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4I. THERE HAVE BEEN NO DEVELOPMENTS IN AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS PER SE SINCE SUBMISSION OF REPORT IN FY 78 CPD WHICH ARE LIKELY TO HAVE SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE ON USG RELATIONS WITH JORDAN AND ON ATTITUDES OF CONGRESS AND

AMERICAN PEOPLE TOWARD GOJ. FEDAYEEN ATTACK ON JORDAN INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL IN NOVEMBER, 1976, DID, HOWEVER, UNDERSCORE DEGREE TO WHICH PRESENCE OF ARMED ELEMENTS ACTIVELY HOSTILE TO KING HUSSEIN'S REGIME PUTS PRESSURE ON GOJ OCCASIONALLY TO UTILIZE STRICT SURVEILLANCE AND INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES.

DENIAL OF JORDANIAN SECURITY ASSISTANCE REQUESTS IN SIGNIFICANT MEASURE, BY CREATING ATMOSPHERE OF POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY AND ENCOURAGING ARMED OPPOSITION OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY TO TRY TO RETURN, COULD RESULT IN APPLICATION BY JORDANIANS OF HARSHER INTERNAL MEASURES, WITH CONSEQUENT DETERIORATION IN HUMAN RIGHTS. RESTRICTIONS ON SECURITY ASSISTANCE WHICH MIGHT THREATEN INTERNAL SECURITY OF JORDAN WOULD BE SEEN BY GOJ AS NECESSITATING STRINGENT MEASURES DESIGNED TO COUNTER FEDAYEEN AND OTHER ANTI-HASHEMITE ACTIVITIES.

JORDAN, WITH FREEDOM OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TRAVEL, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, FREQUENT AMNESTIES, AND FREE-MARKET
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ECONOMY, IS A CENTRALIZED, AUTHORITARIAN, NOT TOTALITARIAN, STATE. APPROVAL OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE REQUESTS WOULD HELP ALLOW GOJ TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE STATE OF DEFENSE READINESS. THIS WOULD IN TURN PERMIT JORDANIANS IN ATMOSPHERE OF CONFIDENCE TO CONTINUE TO PURSUE RELATIVELY OPEN HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES IN LIGHT OF POST-CIVIL-WAR RELATIVE RELAXATION OF PALESTINIAN/SUBVERSIVE THREAT TO HASHEMITE REGIME.

4J. WE BELIEVE THAT GOJ FULLY UNDERSTANDS POLICY OF RESTRAINT ON ARMS TRANSFERS. ON OTHER HAND, THEY ALSO KNOW TOO WELL THE CAPABILITIES AND QUANTITIES OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT ALREADY ACQUIRED BY NEIGHBORING STATES, ESPECIALLY ISRAEL. JORDAN SEES ISRAEL AS ITS MOST IMMEDIATE AND PRIMARY THREAT AND WILL BE LOOKING ESPECIALLY TO THE US FOR ADEQUATE EQUIPMENT TO DEFEND AGAINST THIS THREAT. JORDAN IS NOT A MAJOR ARMS SUPPLIER. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE SURE ISRAELI FORCES WERE CUT WAY DOWN BEFORE AGREEING TO CUT BACK ON ITS OWN.

4K. TYPES OF TRAINING THAT SHOULD BE PROGRAMMED UNDER IMET TO SERVE US INTERESTS ARE CURRENTLY CLOSELY DESIGNED TO JORDAN'S OWN INTERESTS.

JORDAN USES IMET PROGRAM PRIMARILY TO TRAIN INSTRUCTOR CADRE FOR IN-COUNTRY MILITARY SCHOOLS. TRAINING FALLS INTO FIVE MAIN CATEGORIES: (A) PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION, (B) TACTICAL AND TACTICAL-RELATED COURSES, (C) TECHNICAL EDUCATION, (D) MANAGEMENT RELATED COURSES, PARTICULARLY MATERIEL, MANPOWER AND FINANCIAL AND (E) TRAINING AIDS AND PUBLICATIONS TO SUPPORT IN-COUNTRY PROGRAMS.

THIS TRAINING SERVES US INTERESTS BECAUSE IT: (A) PROVIDES JORDAN WITH TRAINED PERSONNEL TO MAINTAIN AND OPERATE US-FURNISHED EQUIPMENT, (B) INSURES INCREASED EFFICIENCY, CAPABILITY AND RELIANCE ON IN-COUNTRY JAF
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MILITARY SCHOOLS FOR TRAINING, (C) INSURES CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT IN QUALITY AND REPUTATION OF JAF SCHOOLS, (D) PERMITS JORDAN TO CONTINUE TO AVOID, AS IT STRONGLY WISHES, PERMANENT IN-COUNTRY US TRAINING OR ADVISOR PRESENCE. THIS HAS AND WILL RESULT IN INCREASED REQUESTS FROM FRIENDLY ARAB STATES TO TRAIN THEIR PERSONNEL AND FOR JORDANIAN ADVISORS. THIS, IN TURN, INCREASES JORDAN'S MODERATE AND PRO-US POLITICAL APPROACH, (E) DEVELOPS JORDANIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO, BY VIRTUE OF THEIR CONUS TRAINING, KNOWLEDGE OF US CUSTOMS AND PERSONAL CONTACTS WITH AMERICANS, ARE FRIENDLY TOWARDS THE US, (F) INSURES THAT JAF CAN ACHIEVE OPTIMUM RESULTS FROM THEIR WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT. WILL ALSO ENABLE THEM TO ABSORB AND MANAGE ADDITIONAL US SUPPORT THAT MIGHT BE DELIVERED ON SHORT NOTICE IN AN EMERGENCY, AND (G) INSURES JAF'S CAPABILITY TO EFFICIENTLY MANAGE MORE MODERN MILITARY FORCE.

MOST OF JORDAN'S EQUIPMENT-RELATED TRAINING FROM

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ACTION PM-04

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01 INR-07

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15
USIA-06 ACDA-07 MC-02 IGA-02 TRSE-00 OMB-01 EB-07
COME-00 DHA-02 AID-05 IO-13 EUR-12 /107 W
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R 050627Z JUL 77

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2212
INFO USCINCEUR/ECJ4/7-SAME

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THE US IN SUPPORT OF NEW EQUIPMENT ACQUISITIONS IS PURCHASED UNDER FMS. MOST OF THE EQUIPMENT-RELATED TRAINING UNDER GRANT AID IS EITHER IN SUPPORT OF GRANT AID-FURNISHED EQUIPMENT OR FOR THE TRAINING OF INSTRUCTOR CADRE FOR IN-COUNTRY SCHOOLS. SHOULD GRANT AID TRAINING NOT BE AVAILABLE, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT JORDAN COULD PURCHASE EQUIPMENT-RELATED TRAINING WITHOUT THIRD COUNTRY HELP.

5. WE BELIEVE JORDAN, GIVEN ITS PRESENT AND FUTURE FINANCIAL FRAILITIES AND ITS SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS, SHOULD CONTINUE TO RECEIVE GRANT ASSISTANCE. THE JORDAN FMS CREDIT PROGRAM IS UNIQUE. IT COMES TO JORDAN AS GRANT, EXCEPT FOR THE OBLIGATION TO PAY THE INTEREST ON THE LOANS. SOME MORE CREDIT EACH YEAR HAS BEEN ADDED TO HELP REDUCE GRANT, BUT THIS HAS BEEN DONE SLOWLY TO ALLOW JORDAN TIME TO FIND BACKERS TO REPAY ITS CREDITS. THUS, REDUCTION IN CREDIT TO JORDAN AS GRANT IS GOING DOWN WILL HAVE AN ESPECIALLY HEAVY IMPACT IN BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY TERMS. TO EXTENT WE WANT A MODERATE, NEGOTIATIONS-ORIENTED ARAB FRIEND IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO SURVIVE AND TO HELP THE US ACHIEVE ITS GOAL OF BRINGING PEACE TO THE AREA--TO
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THAT EXTENT WE NEED TO CONTINUE TO KEEP JORDAN DEFENSIBLE AND STABLE.

AMBASSADOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. WE BELIEVE WE WILL NEED A SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN JORDAN IN FY 79 AND BEYOND, TO INCLUDE A SIGNIFICANT GRANT COMPONENT AS WELL AS THIRD-PARTY-FINANCED FMS CREDIT.

THE EXACT LEVELS WILL BE IN THE MAIN A FUNCTION OF THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WHICH, IN VIEW OF THE LARGE MILITARY EQUIPMENT SUPERIORITY OF EACH OF JORDAN'S POTENTIAL ANTAGONISTS IN THE REGION, THE US HAS NOT BEEN IN A POSITION FULLY TO SATISFY BUT ALSO OF FUNDING AND

MANPOWER AVAILABLE. THESE LEVELS ARE ALSO A FUNCTION OF POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING THE POTENTIAL PARTICIPATION OF JORDAN IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE DEGREE OF USG MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, WHICH WE ANTICIPATE WILL REMAIN SUBSTANTIAL. AN ADDITIONAL FACTOR WILL BE SOVIET SALES AND ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA AND IRAQ. WE BELIEVE POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS ALONE NECESSITATE THE RETENTION OF A SIZEABLE GRANT MAP COMPONENT IN FY 79 OF AROUND \$50 MILLION.

2. WE ALSO RECOMMEND AN FY 79 FMS CREDIT LEVEL OF ABOUT \$95 MILLION, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PRINCIPAL OF SUCH CREDIT IS TO BE REPAID NOT BY JORDAN BUT BY A THIRD COUNTRY, AS HAS BEEN THE CASE IN THE FMS CREDIT PROGRAMS SINCE FY 75. THE RECENT JORDANIAN SUCCESS IN OBTAINING SAUDI AGREEMENT TO REPAY THE \$82.5 MILLION FY 76 CREDIT PROGRAM SUGGESTS THAT CONTINUATION OF THIS FMS CREDIT ARRANGEMENT STILL HAS PROMISE ALTHOUGH BACKERS FOR THE FY 77 AND FY 78 PROGRAM HAVE NOT YET BEEN FOUND. WITH THE GROWING

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WEALTH OF THE OIL-RICH STATES HOWEVER, JORDAN CAN PURSUE FMS BACKING NOT ONLY FROM SAUDI ARABIA, BUT ALSO FROM POTENTIAL DONORS SUCH AS THE UAE, KUWAIT, QATAR, AND POSSIBLY IRAN AND OMAN. IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THAT THIS THIRD-PARTY-BACKED FMS CREDIT ARRANGEMENT WAS ORIGINALLY, AND CONTINUES TO BE, JUSTIFIED AS MEETING THE MINIMUM POLITICAL AND MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR JORDAN, WHICH RESOURCE-POOR JORDAN IS UNABLE TO FINANCE UNDER NORMAL FMS CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS. ACCORDINGLY, SHOULD JORDAN BE UNABLE TO FIND A BACKER FOR ITS FY 77, FY 78 OR FY 79 CREDIT, THIS SITUATION WOULD INCREASE THE NEED FOR AN INCREASE IN GRANT ASSISTANCE IN FUTURE YEARS.

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Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
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